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cover the fixed cost of building an alternative fuel pump. I use this framework to compare the effectiveness
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alternative fuels is an effective policy to indirectly increase low emission car sales.
JEL Classification: H23, H25, L11, L91, Q48.
Keywords: Alternative fuel cars; Entry; Environmental policy.
∗Department of Economics and Finance, University of Rome “Tor Vergata”, Rome, Italy. E-mail: pa-
van.giulia@gmail.com. I am grateful to my advisor Andrea Pozzi for his advise and encouragement. I would also
like to thank Alessandro Gavazza, Paul Grieco, Marit Hinnosaar, Cristian Huse, Laura Nurski, Mathias Reynaert,
Philipp Schmidt-Dengler, Margaret Slade, Otto Toivanen, Tommaso Valletti, Jo Van Biesebroeck, Frank Verboven,
Michael Waterson, conference participants at CEPR IO School/JIE Conference on Applied Industrial Organization
2015, 3rd IAERE, 6th ICEEE, EIEF-Unibo-IGIER IV Workshop in Industrial Organization, VII VPDE Workshop,
EARIE 2014 and seminar participants at University of Tor Vergata, CES-KU Leuven and IRVAPP for useful com-
ments. I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the University of Tor Vergata and EIEF and the hospitality
of KU Leuven. The usual disclaimers apply.
1
1 Introduction
Fostering the use of more environmentally friendly fuels, like Liquified Petroleum Gas (LPG)
and Compressed Natural Gas (CNG), is named consistently as a policy priority across advanced
economies. The implementation of such strategies must act simultaneously on two fronts: prompting
consumers to buy cars running on alternative fuels (AF) and increasing the number of refill stations
offering such fuels.1 Although the interdependence of these two goals has obvious implications for
the effectiveness of alternative fuel adoption policies, the role of fuel availability in green cars
demand is seldom considered.
This paper develops and estimates a joint model of demand for cars and supply of fuels. On the
demand side, I model the consumer demand for cars with particular emphasis on the choice of the
type of fuel the car runs on. On the supply side, filling stations must decide whether to install
alternative fuel pumps on top of providing gasoline and diesel. The link between the two sides of
the model is given by the fact that customers care about refilling costs. Hence, when choosing their
car, they take into account the price and the density of stations offering the type of fuel utilized. At
the same time, filling stations will only be willing to install AF pumps if there are enough customers
driving cars powered by AF in the area. This unified framework allows for the joint analysis of the
effect of different environmental policies. In a counterfactual exercise, I compare the effectiveness
of subsidizing the cost of installing LPG and CNG pumps (supply push) to that of supporting the
adoption of green cars (demand pull). I find evidences of the effectiveness of filling station subsidies
on AF vehicles adoption.
The setting for this study is the Italian market, which is characterized by a high share of new
LPG and CNG cars and a heterogeneous dislocation of filling stations among markets. I assemble
a novel dataset which is uniquely suited to study the question, merging information from several
sources. I collect data on car sale price, fuel type and other characteristics for newly purchased cars
by private holders. I, then, combine them with information on location and range of fuels offered
by the universe of filling stations active in 2012 in Italy. Moreover, I exploit differences in local
legislation relative to traffic limitations for traditional fuel cars, reduced taxes for alternative fuel
1For example, in European Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council sets a market
share target of 10% of renewable vehicles in transport fuels. See European Directive (2014) which “sets out minimum
requirements for the building-up of AF infrastructure, including recharging points for electric vehicles and refueling
points for natural gas (LNG and CNG) and hydrogen”. In the USA, 1990 Clean Air Act, CAFE standards (2002)
and Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007.
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vehicles and laws imposing filling stations the supply of at least one alternative fuel.
The empirical analysis consists of two steps. First, I set up a standard discrete choice demand
model, assuming that car choice depends, among other things, on fuel costs and filling station
density. I specify a nested logit, considering cars with the same fuel-type closer substitutes than
other vehicles.
Next, I model the decision of gas stations to add an alternative fuel pump as an entry decision
(in the spirit of Bresnahan and Reiss, 1991). and Berry and Waldfogel (1999). The number of
alternative fuel retailers is the result of an entry game of complete information, where variable
profits accrued to a firm depend on the estimates of the demand side of the model.
The main takeaway of the demand model is that consumers are sensitive to fuel availability and
this effect is especially strong for AF. That is, demand pump density elasticity for green cars is
0.26 and 0.36 for LPG and CNG cars respectively. The elasticity to density of traditional fuel cars
is only 0.13 for diesel and 0.04 for gasoline cars.
On the gas station side, estimation implies that the fixed cost of adding an LPG pump is AC41, 681
while adding a CNG pump is AC163, 388, an estimate that is consistent with values reported by
experts of the sector.
Lastly, I use the demand and entry estimates to simulate the effects of two alternative policies
designed to boost AF cars adoption: a 2,000e rebate on the price of AF cars and a 50% subsidy
to the installation of an AF pump. Subsidizing consumers would increase the share of LPG cars
by 29.83% and CNG cars by 33.31%, leading to a 3.09% and 5.31% increase in the density of
filling stations. Subsidizing gas stations would increase the availability of AF by 59.86% (LPG) and
65.67% (CNG): such a policy would increase the car share by 16.92% and 96.09% respectively for
LPG and CNG. These results suggest that subsidizing fuel retailers to offer AF is an effective policy
to indirectly increase AF vehicle sales. However, comparing the two policies results are mixed and
should be evaluated at market level.
To my knowledge, this is the first paper to propose a full-fledged demand and supply model to
study the incentives to alternative fuel adoption. Shriver (2015) considers a similar framework but
with a more stylized demand model, where car price does not play a role. Furthermore, this is
one of the first papers to consider fuel availability as a determinant for the demand of cars. Huse
and Lucinda (2014) estimate a rich model for car demand, including fuel type among the relevant
characteristics. However, they do not consider the role of fuel availability. The modeling choice of
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including fuel availability is supported by empirical evidence. Langer and McRae (2013) use real
world driving data with traditional fuels to provide compelling evidence that this dimension plays
a key role in fuel vehicle choice.
The policy question this paper addresses relates to the vast literature on government intervention
to limit fossil fuel consumption and promote green fuels. For instance, there is growing literature
that tries to identify to what extent consumers take into account future savings in fuel costs when
buying fuel efficient cars.2 Another strand in the literature examines the effect of standards (CAFE
regulation in the US) on new car adoption (Goldberg, 1998 and Austin and Dinan, 2005) and used
car adoption (Jacobsen, 2013). Closer to my research question, Beresteanu and Li (2011) investigate
the effects of federal income tax incentives on the demand for hybrid vehicle.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provided information on the green car market in Italy
are and presents data sources. Section 3 and 4 discuss the model and the econometric specification.
Section 5 shows and discusses estimation results. Section 6 presents policy counterfactuals, in
particular a comparison between car price rebates and filling station subsidies. Section 7 concludes.
2 Data and background
2.1 Data
I combine data from multiple sources to construct two main databases used in the analysis. The
first contains information on quantities, prices and characteristics of all the cars sold in Italy in
2012; the second includes details on location and fuel offer of Italian gas stations in the same year.
Automobile sales, prices and characteristics
I obtain car sales at municipality level from the vehicle registration database3 (vehicle registra-
tion is mandatory in Italy). I focus on private purchases and drop corporate car purchases, this
leaves 882,641 cars sold in 2012. Prices and other characteristics have been collected from industry
publications 4. The price information includes the list price and the registration tax (IPT), which
vary at local level.5 The other car characteristics I consider are: horse power, type of fuel, fuel
2see Allcott and Greenstone (2012) for a recent detailed review. More recently, Allcott and Wozny (2014) and
Grigolon Reynaert and Verboven (2014).
3maintained by Automobile Club d’Italia ACI
4“Quattroruote” and “Panoramauto”
5In some Provinces the tax is reduced for AF cars.
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consumption, trunk capacity and acceleration time to speed from 0 to 100km/h.
Since the databases report data at different levels of aggregation (sales data are not broken down
by optionals), I match car sales with price and characteristics of the standard equipment.6
Gas stations
The location and characteristics of filling stations were provided by prezzibenzina.it, an Italian web-
site which offers information about retail gasoline prices and location as posted by website visitors
and verified by the staff. Since 2009, they cover over 90% of the Italian filling stations. For the
19,892 filling stations active in Italy in 2012, I observe the fuels they offer and their location, I use
the date in which they entered the database as a proxy of the entry in the market. I cross check
these data with the ones provided by www.ecomotori.net, which lists all the stations offering AF
and those reported in the Italian Competition Authority Investigation on off-brand conventional
fuels filling station (AGCM, 2013).
I aggregate data at market level, considering Labour Market Areas (LMAs) as a market.7 LMAs
are sub-regional geographical areas developed by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (Istat),
through an allocation process based on the analysis of commuting patterns.8 There are 611 dis-
tinct areas. They are designed to obtain meaningful comparable sub-regional labour market areas.
However, they perfectly adapt to define fuel markets, given their functional definition based on
commuting patterns.9
2.1.1 Summary statistics
Table 1 reports summary statistics on vehicle characteristics weighted by sales, reported by
fuel. The level of observation is a variant, defined as the combination of make, model, body type
(including doors) and engine displacement.10 I observe sales in 611 labour market area each month
in 2012. Such a disaggregation leads to many variant/market/month combination with no sales.
6Performance characteristics are the same for all the equipments since the engine is the same.
7Local labour systems – SLL in Italian.
82011 LMAs are based on commuting data stemming from the 15th Population Census.
9LMAs are designed to respect only municipality administrative boundary constraints: 56 of them cut across
regional boundaries and 185 span across different provinces. However, 85% of interprovincial provinces are charac-
terized by a prevalent province in which are concentrated more than 80% of the observations. I computed variables
which varies at local level as a weighted average. Looking at regional tax legislation, only 34 car models were subject
to different legislations.
10An example of variant is Volkswagen Golf: I can distinguish among different frames (sedan, station wagon, cabrio
and multispace), the engine size and the fuel (1.2 TSI, 1.4 TSI, 1.6 TSI, 1.6 bifuel, 1.6 TDI, 2.0 TDI, 2.0 TDI 4
motion and 2.0 GTD).
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[Table 1 about here.]
Table 2 reports summary statistics of the variable used to compute variable profit, the expected
variable profit and a binary variable indicating whether in that LMA the regional law regulates the
opening of a new filling station imposing the supply of at least three fuels.
[Table 2 about here.]
2.2 Italian Green Cars and Alternative Fuels Markets
Alternative fuels (AF) include, among others, ethanol, biodiesel, compressed and liquified nat-
ural gas, electricity and hydrogen. I focus on Compressed Natural Gas (CNG), or methane, and
on Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG), or autogas, which represent the bulk of the market in Italy.
Italy represents a very interesting market, since the share of AF cars (Figure 1), as well as the
number of filling stations offering AF, is increasing. Although AF are different in nature and in
their environmental impact, most of them not only produce much less tailpipe pollution and CO2
emissions, but they can also be significantly cheaper to run. The market share of these types of
cars is historically higher in Italy than in the rest of Europe: 77% of CNG European cars and
26% of LPG ones are registered in Italy. Further, Italian industry sector accounts for excellence
both in engine transformation and in storage and distribution. Finally, there has been a significant
legislative activity both on the supply of AF, with the liberalization of the retail fuel market,11
and on the green car market, which benefited from generous incentives in 200912 in the form of a
scrappage scheme.
[Figure 1 about here.]
The left panel in Figure 1 shows the share of cars sold in Italy from 2002 to 2014 by fuel type.
The share of AF cars (LPG and CNG) shows a positive trend, in particular after 2006. Looking
11With the constitutional act n.3 of October 18th, 2001. Fuels retailing is not considered a public service any more
and jurisdiction in regulating filling stations entry is assigned to Regions.
Law 6 Agosto 2008 n.133 removed bureaucratic barriers to entry.
The most recent regulation of the sector is the decree “Urgent provisions for competition, development of infrastruc-
ture and competitiveness” GU n. 19, 24 April 2012. It further liberalizes the sector and provides for the obligation
of a decree to be issued by the Ministry of the Interior to “modernize” and amend the regulations pertaining to
self-service and natural gas multi-dispensers.
12Dl 10 febbraio 2009, n.5 “Misure urgenti a sostegno dei settori industriali in crisi” - GU n. 34 11 febbraio 2009. It
introduced a scrappage scheme for Euro4 new cars (AC1, 500) for traditional fuels. This incentives could be combined
with purchase incentive of at least AC1, 500 for a new car running on LPG, CNG, electricity or hydrogen.
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at the right panel in Figure 1, which displays quantities, it is clear that the increase in the share
of AF cars is due to both an increase of the total quantity sold in the market and to a decrease
of new car registrations in the Italian market since 2007. The peak registered in 2009-2010 could
be explained by the scrappage scheme mentioned above. The incentive, in fact, could be claimed
for purchases up to the first quarter of 2010. Although the whole sector was subsidized, only the
additional incentives dedicated to AF cars seem to affect the quantity of new cars and the effect
on the LPG is much stronger than the one on the CNG. This evidence is particularly interesting in
order to study the role of the diffusion of filling pumps. As a matter of fact, one possibility is that
LPG cars were more reactive to price incentives since their filling stations density was higher.13
The drop in volumes for AF cars in 2011 can be linked to the scheme that likely caused intertempo-
ral substitution of demand due to the widespread belief that the incentive was temporary. In order
to better understand the role of fuel price in the choice of green cars, Figure 2 shows the fuel cost
per 100 km for an average “compact” car. CNG is the cheapest fuel, while LPG is always cheaper
than gasoline and sometimes very close to diesel cost. Moreover, gasoline and diesel prices show an
increasing trend, wile the AF price trend is more stable. Notice that alternative fuels are subject
to a different tax regime with respect to traditional fuel regime, which contributes to widen the
differences in running cost.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Figure 3 shows the diffusion of alternative fuel cars over the country (considering only private
owners). We can see that LPG cars are sold all over the country while CNG cars are particularly
concentrated in some areas.
[Figure 3 about here.]
Fuel price differences do not seem to play a role in explaining this heterogeneity since alternative
fuel prices are not dispersed (the LPG and CNG price in 2012 were respectively 0.83e/liter and
0.98e/kilogram with a standard deviation of 0.053 and 0.037).14 Geographical differences play a
stronger role in the heterogeneous development of AF networks. Namely, mountainous regions are
not covered by the networks and South and Island never developed a CNG network. While in
13See Appendix A.
14LPG and CNG are measured respectively in liter and in kilogram. Therefore, it is not possible to compare them
directly. However, CNG is usually cheaper per kilometer to run than LPG, as shown above.
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Sardinia the lack of a local pipeline has not allowed the development of a local CNG network, in
the rest of the South of Italy the network did not develop given the lack of local investments. In
mountainous regions pipelines are less accessible and refiling the station through trucks is more
costly. Further, the maps show the first evidence of the strong correlation between AF cars share
and the pump density (the black dots are the alternative fuel pump stations operating in 2012),
which is also confirmed in Figure 4, where scatterplots between the share of AF cars sold in 2012
and the AF filling station density are presented. It already shows the strongly significant positive
correlation which will be further investigated in what follows.
[Figure 4 about here.]
3 Empirical Model
The empirical model describes consumer demand for cars and filling stations’ choices of entry
in the AF retail industry. The model is static and the timing is as follows. The period starts with
a given stock of registered cars for each type of fuel in each market. Then, existing traditional
fuel stations simultaneously decide whether to add alternative fuel pumps, given the expected local
market demand of fuel and the number of competitors. The expected demand of fuel depends both
on the stock of already circulating cars and on the number of expected newly registered cars. Lastly,
a consumer decides whether to buy a car with a certain fuel, given the number of filling stations
in the market at the time in which she undertakes the decision. Consumers behave myopically,
that is, they do not form expectations on the evolution of the number of circulating cars and filling
stations.15
I introduce the model starting from the last stage. Identification of both sides of the model is
discussed in Section 4.
3.1 Demand
Demand is modeled as a standard discrete choice problem with differentiated products. I assume
that the consumer maximizes a linear utility, taking into account the characteristics of the vehicles.
15This assumption is dictated by the fact that the model is static. Myopic behavior when purchasing durable
goods that vary in energy costs have been firstly studied by Hausman (1979). Although the focus of this literature
is the energy cost and not its availability, the absence of conclusive evidence suggests that this assumption could be
considered realistic. For a detailed overview of the literature, see Busse et al (2010).
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I consider m = 1, ...,M local markets (LMA), each with h = 1, ...,H households. For each market I
observe the quantity of sold cars; product characteristics for a car model j = 1, ..., J , which install
a specific fuel f = 1, ..., F , are the same across markets. I assume that in a given year households
can choose to buy a vehicle among the set of cars available in the market, or not to buy a new car.
The potential market is defined accounting for annual household’s income and the average vehicle
age. I implement a nested logit model where cars are nested according to the fuel they run on.16
Products are grouped in F + 1 exhaustive and mutually exclusive nests. The utility of the outside
good (not buying a car) is normalized to zero. I define the indirect utility of a consumer h in market
m from buying a car model j(f), as a function of product characteristics, fuel characteristics and
utility parameters to be estimated
uhj(f)m = δj(f)m + νhj(f)m =
=αpj(f)m + xj(f)β + nfmλ+ ξj(f)m + ζhfm + (1− σ)εhj(f)m,
h = 1, . . . ,Hm, j = 1, . . . , J, m = 1, . . . ,M, f = 1, . . . , F.
(1)
where δj(f)m = αpj(f) + xj(f)β + nfmλh + ξj(f)m is the mean utility; pj(f)m is the price of a car
model installing fuel f , j(f), in market m17, xj(f) is a vector of observed car characteristics, nfm
is the number of filling stations offering the fuel compatible with the car j(f), ξj(f) represents
unobserved car characteristics.
To capture the correlation in taste across cars with similar fuels, I nest cars by the type of fuel f
they run on. The individual specific part of the utility given by car j in market m is νhj(f)m =
ζhfm + (1 − σ)εhj(f)m, where εhj(f)m is an i.i.d. extreme value term and ζhf is common to all
products in group f and follows distributional assumption of a nested logit which depends on σ
(Cardell, 1997).
3.2 Entry
The entry model regards the choice of filling station selling traditional fuels to enter the alter-
native fuel market adding a pump for LPG or CNG. I model this choice as a game of complete
16Although alternative fuel cars are mostly bi-fuel, I assume the consumers who choose these type of vehicles are
mainly interested in performance characteristic of the car when it runs with the alternative fuel, given the price gap
between these fuels and gasoline (see Figure 2).
17Price is indexed by m because the presence of local taxes makes it market specific.
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information in the spirit of Bresnahan and Reiss (1991). I consider the alternative fuel market as a
homogeneous good industry18 and assume that all the gas stations operating in 2012 are potential
entrants in the alternative fuel market.19 Post entry profits accruing to firm i from offering a type
of fuel in market m take the following form:
Πim = (pim − ci)li(pim, p−im, nm)︸ ︷︷ ︸
V Pi(nm)
−Fim (2)
where pim represents the price per liter (kilogram) at which the firm sells the fuel and ci is the
marginal cost. The residual demand faced by the filling station is denoted by li (since it measures
the liters or kilograms sold) and depends on the price set by the firm, those chosen by its competitors
and the number of firms in the market.
In order to enter the market firms must pay a fixed cost Fim (independent from the number of firms
in the market) to cover installation of new infrastructure.
In order to identify the parameter of post-entry profits I make the further simplifying assumptions
(Berry and Waldfogel, 1999):
• Within markets, firms have identical marginal and fixed costs.20
• Drivers split their fuel consumption equally across gas stations21 in a given market so that
demand for fuel faced by a generic station in market m is:
l(q(nm)) =
1
nm
[km(q(nm) +Qm)] (3)
where km is the average fuel consumed by a car compatible with the fuel offered by the station
and Qm and q(nm) are, respectively, the stock of already circulating cars consuming the fuel
sold by the station and the number of newly registered cars consuming the fuel. The latter,
as illustrated in the demand model, will depend on the number of filling stations selling the
fuel in the market.
18Alternative fuels are not differentiated in regular and premium fuel as traditional ones.
19Since early 2000 new LPG and CNG pumps opened in traditional fuel filling stations thanks to changes in safety
legislation, D.M. 2002 June, 28th.
20Marginal costs are strongly related to international fuel prices and are set by large companies at national level.
Fixed costs are mostly related with building costs and new infrastructures are built by specialized firms.
21This assumption is coherent with both Salop (1979) circle competition and with Cournot competition, which are
the two main ways of modeling competition in this market.
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Hence, I can rewrite profits as Πim = (pm − c)l(q(nm))− Fm = vpm(q(nm))− Fm.
4 Identification and Estimation
4.1 Demand
In order to estimate the mean utility parameters in (1), α, β and λ, I follow Berry (1994). I
obtain a linear estimating equation for the logarithm of the market share of car j relatively to the
market share of the outside good:
ln
(
sj(f)m
s0m
)
= αpj(f)m + xj(f)β + nfmλ+ σ ln sj(f)|fm + ξj(f) (4)
where sj(f)|fm is the market share of product j(f) within the nest f and pj(f)m is the price of
the model j in the market m. In the demand specification I include both physical characteristics
(length) and performance characteristics (ratio of power over weight and the acceleration). The only
time varying characteristic is the fuel cost for 100km computed as the product of time-invariant fuel
efficiency of the car (kilometers per liter) and the price of the fuel the car runs on, which instead
varies in time. I also include month, LMA and brand fixed effect as well as segment fixed effect.
I take into account the endogeneity of price and market share of product j(f) within the group f . As
it is standard in the literature (Berry et al., 1994), I use as instruments the sum of the characteristics
of cars used in the regression produced by the same firm and produced by other firms.22 Moreover,
I include two shifters of alternative fuel vehicles demand driven by local legislation: a dummy
variable equal to one if at least a municipality in the LMA in 2010 blocked circulation of vehicles
but alternative fuel ones for at least one day23 and a dummy variable equal to one if the Region
provides exemption for the annual taxes only for alternative fuel cars. Given the timing of the
model and the characteristics of the filling station entry decision (it takes more than one year to
open a new filling station), I consider the density of filling stations as an exogenous variable. In
22Instead of fuel costs, fuel efficiency is used for computing the instruments, since it is constant across markets.
23The European Directive 2008/50/EC on ambient air quality was adopted by Italian legislation in 2010 (D.Lgs.
155/2010 and D.Lgs 250/2012). Regional government can decide policy to undertake in case of passing limit level
of SO2, NO2, C6H6, CO, Pb and fine particles (PM10 e PM2.5). Fine particles are the more relevant for urban
traffic and many municipalities adopted weekend traffic closures to face the problem. Alternative fuel vehicles, being
significantly lower on particle emissions are often exempt by traffic block. In order to identify the municipality
that adopted this regulation we refer to a list available at the national association of Italian municipality, ANCI
http : //www.anci.it/index.cfm?layout = dettaglio&IdSez = 10325&IdDett = 22223
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Appendix C I perform check of the robustness of my results to this assumption.
4.2 Entry
Given the assumption made in section 3.2, we will observe nm such that
Πm(q(nm)) > 0 and Πm(q(nm + 1)) < 0 (5)
I exploit several data sources to quantify the variable profit components so as to treat them as data.
I will instead assume that fixed entry costs are not observed.
I use data from the ACI on the stock of existing cars by fuel in each market (Qm in equation
(3)) and information provided by the Ministry of Economic Development on average LPG and
CNG consumption(km). Mark ups (p− c) are considered constant at national level and are chosen
according to provisional profit and loss accounts available on the Internet and confirmed by pump
producer (toil.spa) and by interviewed pumps owners. Lastly, I compute the quantity of new cars
(q(nm)) given the functional form specified in the demand model.
I then assume that the logarithm of the fixed cost of entry in market m is:
ln(Fm) = γWm + ωνm (6)
where γ and ω are the parameters we would like to estimate and νm is a standard normal. Wm is a
vector of market specific observable cost shifters. Namely, I include cadestral value of the real estate
and dummies which identify the presence of a regional law imposing the supply of one alternative
fuel and geographical dummies. Equation (6) implies that nm entrants in market m are consistent
with the following inequalities.
ln(v̂pm(nm + 1))− γWm
ω
≤ νm ≤ ln(v̂pm(nm))− γWm
ω
where v̂pm(nm) are the variable profits quantified using data sources mentioned above.
The distributional assumption on νm allows me to write the following likelihood for the event that
n gas station decide to offer LPG in the market m.
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L(θ) =
∑
ln
(
Φ
(
ln(v̂pm(nm))− γWm
ω
)
− Φ
(
ln(v̂pm(n+ 1))− γWm
ω
))
(7)
The parameters of fixed cost function, γ, are retrieved as those that maximize the likelihood.
4.3 Equilibrium
The equilibrium of the model is given by n∗ and q∗ that satisfy equation (5), given demand
and entry parameters identified in equations (4) and (7). Following Breshnan and Reiss (1991),
modeling the number of entrants, instead of identities, requires for uniqueness of equilibrium that
profit is strictly decreasing in the number of entrants (that is,∂Π(nf )∂nf < 0). However, the number
of active AF stations enters nonlinearly in the profit function since q(nm) is a non linear function
of n.24 Then, this condition is not verified for any positive n.25 Therefore, the model has multiple
equilibria. However, the profit function is decreasing in n over the support [0,n¯], where n¯ is the
maximum number of stations observed in any market in the data. Therefore, I can solve the
multiplicity problem by selecting the only equilibrium where the resulting number of firms lies in
the support observed in the data.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Demand
In Table 3 I report the coefficients estimated using a standard OLS logit regression, an IV logit
and IV nested logit.
[Table 3 about here.]
Market size is given by the total number taxpayers with annual income higher than 10,000 euro
living in the LMA, scaled to accommodate for the fact that cars are durable goods.26 I also tried
different specifications, assuming households consider whether to buy a car every 5 or 6 years and
24See Appendix 2 for further details.
25for some n, q(n+ 1) >> q(n) to the point that q(n+ 1)/(n+ 1) > Q(n)/n
26I assume that taxpayers consider to buy a new car every 4 years, given evidence on Italian car market (ACI
statistics, 2014).
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results are in line with the ones presented.
Price has a significant and negative impact on consumers’ mean utility. In particular, the implied
average own-price elasticity is −3.48 in the nested logit, which is in line with other estimates of the
European cars’ market (Goldberg and Verboven, 2001.
The physical dimensions of the car have a positive and significant effect on the mean utility, while the
performance characteristics have a less clear effect, acceleration time is negative and significant while
power/weight is more sensitive to model identification. The estimate of the fuel costs parameter is
negative and significant. However, it is sensitive to model specification, suggesting that one possible
rationalization of this puzzling result is that consumers are more sensitive to the reduction of costs
related to deviations from their optimal route than fuel cost savings.
This is further confirmed by the analysis of the coefficients on filling stations availability. I include
pump density interacted with fuel dummies in order to allow for a different relationship between fuel
availability and cars demand, while keeping mean utility linear. This specification can accommodate
S-shaped relationship between fuel availability and cars demand, given that the density of filling
station is homogeneous among markets. All density parameters are positive and significant in the
three specifications (the additional effect of diesel is negative but the overall effect is positive).
However, increasing density of LPG and CNG has a positive effect, greater in magnitude with
respect to the traditional fuels one. In the nested model, the effect of rising by 1% the density of
filling stations for AF increases demand for green cars by, respectively, 0.78% for LPG cars and
0.84% for CNG cars, while the impact of the same variation in the density of traditional fuels on
diesel and gasoline cars is respectively 0.36 % and 0.5%.
The nesting parameter is significantly different from zero and satisfies the restrictions for consistency
with random utility maximization in a nested logit (0 < σ < 1). The results imply that consumer
preferences are more strongly correlated across vehicles with the same fuel-type. However, the small
nesting parameter, equal to 0.24, still allows for substitution patterns across fuels.
Table 4 lists the average own and cross-price elasticities of demand. Note that along the main
diagonal are reported the average price elasticities of demand for the same fuel, which are higher
than cross fuel elasticity. That is, consumers perceive cars with the same fuel closer substitutes
than cars with different fuels, which is particularly true for AF cars (the elasticities within nests
are higher for AF cars).
[Table 4 about here.]
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5.2 Entry
Table 5 reports estimates of the parameters of an ordered probit obtained by exploiting post-
entry information on variable profit, holding demand estimates fixed.
The constant term parameters represent the logarithm of the mean of the distribution of the fixed
costs and ω is the estimated standard error of the logarithm of fixed costs. Therefore, the implied
mean fixed cost is 40, 028efor LPG and 143,389, which is about half the actual fixed cost reported
by experts of the sector for adding a new pump offering LPG or CNG.27 The estimated standard
errors ω are equal to 0.72 (LPG) and 0.61 (CNG), which implies a fixed cost variance depending
on market characteristics almost three-quarter of the mean fixed cost. Geographical location does
not to play a crucial role in the determination of fixed costs.
[Table 5 about here.]
6 Policy experiments
6.1 Car price rebates vs. filling station subsidies
I use estimated model to compute the effect of different policy incentives to adopt alternative
fuel vehicles. I compare the effectiveness of supporting the adoption of green cars by offering car
price rebates (demand pull) to that of subsidizing the cost of installing alternative fuel pumps (sup-
ply push).
For the demand incentive, I consider the effect of a 2,000e reduction on the sticker price of alterna-
tive fuel cars. The price rebate is in line with the 2009 Italian rebate program and other European
scrapping schemes (Huse and Lucinda(2014) and Grigolon, Leheyda and Verboven(2015)).28 I dis-
tinguish between a “direct effect” defined as the market share of cars running on a particular fuel,
keeping fixed the number of filling stations, and an “overall effect”, which factors that the increase
in market share of AF cars affects the entry choice of filling stations leading to a new equilibrium.
I compare these outcomes with those deriving from a 50% reduction in fixed costs when adding
an alternative fuel pump. The size of this entry subsidy is calibrated so that it mirrors regional
27The figure was reported by an expert of Kalorgas s.p.a.
28In Italy the scrappage scheme involved rebates for purchase of both traditional and alternative fuel cars, the
latter, however, were more generous. 2,000e is the approximate difference in the rebates for the two type of cars.
15
subsidies implemented in 2014-2015 in some regions of Italy.29
In this exercise, I compute the new equilibrium after I reduce by 50% the fixed cost parameter
γ0. The new equilibrium number of AF filling stations is the smallest integer value which satisfies
condition (5), given the quantity of cars sold in the baseline equilibrium. This gives me the “direct
effect”. I determine the “overall effects” by computing the estimated quantity of alternative fuel
cars and the number of filling stations which satisfy the entry condition (5) for Π(q̂(n)), where Π̂(n)
is derived following the procedure described in section 4.2.
Computing the “overall effects” of both policies allows me to compare their impact on the com-
position of new sales by fuel type and alternative fuel pump densities. All results are reported as
percentage deviation from the baseline equilibrium.
When accounting for effect of policies on CO2 emissions and particulate pollutants, it is in princi-
ple relevant to distinguish between consumers scrapping an existing car (presumably with higher
emissions) and consumers buying a new car and, hence, increasing the stock of circulating cars. In
this case, even if the new car runs on green fuels, its purchase would result in an increase of the
emitted CO2. However, my framework does not allow for such distinction, since I do not model
scrappage decision. Hence, I simply compare the effect of the policies on the CO2 emitted by the
new cars sold in 2012, disregarding emissions from cars sold pre-2012.
Table 6 reports the average percentage difference between the estimated market shares under the
baseline model and price reduction of each alternative fuel type car by 2, 000e.
[Table 6 about here.]
The “direct effect” of the policy implies an increase in LPG and CNG market share respectively by
23.84% and 15.39%. The effect of the policy on traditional fuel type cars market share is relatively
small and mirrors the substitution patterns showed in Table 4. That is, the extra market share of
AF cars mainly comes from the outside good. However, looking at the “overall effect”, not only
the AF market shares increase, but also consumers substitute more between traditional and AF
vehicles. We observe an overall effect of LPG vehicles price rebate on LPG vehicles market share
by 29.83%, the reduction of traditional fuels market share by 2.16% each and the increase of LPG
pump density by 3.09%. In the case of CNG vehicles price rebate, the effect is even stronger: CNG
29In 2015 Liguria subsidizes builders of alternative fuel pumps with free grants covering half of the building costs.
Between 2014 and 2015 Region Piemonte financed 30 CNG filling stations with 150,000e and 3 with 80,000e. In
2014 Region Lombardia provided subsides equal to 50% of the fixed costs.
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vehicles market share increases by 33.31%, the reduction of traditional fuel vehicles is about 7%
each and CNG filling station density increases by 5.31%. I also report the effect of the policies in
the markets in which the LPG (CNG) market share variation was equal respectively to the 5th and
95th percentile. The results show the complexity of the effect pattern at market level. Namely,
substitution patterns are not stronger in case of stronger market share effects.
Table 7 reports the variation in the estimated number of pumps per square kilometers under the
baseline situation and after a decrease of the fixed costs of installing a pump by 50%.
[Table 7 about here.]
Under this scenario, the LPG and CNG filling station density rises by, respectively, 59.86% and
65.67%. Looking at the difference between “direct” and “overall” effects of the policy, the demand
pushes an extra 10% and 30% increase in filling station density. The overall effect of the policy on
the market share is stronger in case of CNG and it is due to the higher elasticity of CNG vehicles
pump density.
The variability of the results suggests an heterogeneous effect of policies across markets. I report
in Figure 5 and 6 the total average effects of the two counterfactuals on market share and pump
density in each LMA. The maps show that price subsidies have a more homogeneous effect all over
the country, particularly in case of LPG, while the subsidies to filling stations are more concentrated.
[Figure 5 about here.]
[Figure 6 about here.]
Since the cost of the two policies differ, I perform a back-of-envelope calculation to compute euro
spent per CO2 emission reduction to compare the effectiveness of the two policies. Given the price
rebate “direct effect”, there would be about 150 thousand cars eligible for the consumer subsidy,
with a consequent cost of the price rebate program of about 300 million euros in government rev-
enue. The filling station subsidy applies to more than 5000 LPG pumps and 2000 CNG pumps.
Subsidizing all of them would cost about 450 million euros.30. However, difference in cost expendi-
tures varies across market,as shown in Figure7.
30Here I consider average fixed cost reported by industry experts: about 100,000efor LPG filling stations and
200,000efor CNG. In the policy simulation I consider all filling stations new entrants. Hence, the cost is computed
as if all of them had to be subsidized.
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[Figure 7 about here.]
The histograms show the distribution across markets of the difference in costs between the vehicle
price rebates and the filling station subsidy distinguishing between LPG and CNG policy targets.
That is, when the cost difference is higher than zero, the vehicle price rebates are more costly while
the contrary is true when the cost difference is smaller than zero. In most of the markets (55% for
LPG and 65% for CNG) the cost difference is around zero. The higher cost of the filling station
subsidy policy is strongly correlated to the stock of existing AF cars. Given equations (2) and
(3), stock of cars contributes to the determine the level of Π and so the number of filling stations
entering the market (and the number of subsidies) increase.31
Finally, I calculate whether the policies induce a reduction in CO2 emissions per kilometer, since
the LPG and CNG cars produce respectively 2.5% and 9.3% less CO2 emissions with respect to
gasoline cars.32 Both policies imply, on average, a 1% CO2 reduction per car, showing again high
variability among markets. In order to compare the cost effectiveness of the policy in terms of
reduction of CO2 grams per circulating cars, I divide the total cost of the policy in the market by
the CO2 reduction implied by the market shares under the two counterfactuals.
[Figure 8 about here.]
Results are shown in Figure 8. The bulk of the observations is concentrated around zero. The
higher cost effectiveness of price rebate is due to the substitution between traditional fuel vehicles
and AF ones, which is smaller in case of filling station subsidies.33
Although consumer rebates are more effective in terms of CO2 per car reduction, they do not
indirectly support the entry of filling stations. Therefore, the effect of the policy lasts for the
duration of the subsidy. On the other side, the effect of a filling station subsidy on AF market shares
would continue in the following years since filling stations would remain in the market. Moreover,
consider that 2009 price rebates were introduced as an economic stimulus to increase market demand
31These are also the markets in which the number of installed pumps is higher.
32CO2 emissions are computed as mean weighted by sales of declared CO2 emissions per kilometers as reported
in 2012 price list. If we consider Well to Wheels (WtW) evaluation of CO2 emissions of vehicle use as reported by
the European Energy Agency (TERM 2012: transport indicators tracking progress towards environmental targets in
Europe), emission difference would widen up to 10-22% for LPG and 24% for CNG.
33As shown in Section2.2, between 2006 and 2014, Italian car market faced a strong decline in sales which was, in
2012, equal to 20% with respect to the corresponding month of the previous year. Therefore, the outside good share
in these years are increasing and it contributes to explain the high substitution between outside good and AF.
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for the car sector during the economic crisis, targeting the support to low-emissions vehicles. The
results of the price rebate counterfactual mirrors what happened in that year, the LPG market
share “direct” effect was stronger than CNG. However, the filling station subsidy counterfactuals
show to be more effective in supporting indirectly market demand.
The main takeaway of this comparison is twofold: first, the effectiveness of the policies should be
evaluated at the local level. Second, filling station subsidies are cost effective policies which could
be expected to be more persistent.
6.2 Filling station standards
In the second counterfactual, I simulate the effect of the European Directive No.94(2014) that
“sets out minimum requirements for the building-up of alternative fuels infrastructure”. Since the
Directive does not quantify the minimum requirement, in my exercise I assume it mandates to bring
all markets at least to the pre-reform average in terms of AF pump density. Results are reported
in Table 7
[Table 8 about here.]
The impact of the increase of filling station density at the average level on alternative fuel market
shares is smaller than in previous policy analyzed. In fact, the average density level is low and
reaching that target does not represent a strong policy intervention. To provide an “upper bound”
to this type of “mandate density policies” I calculated what would be the effect of bringing the
density of AF pumps to the same level of the regular fuels. In this case, the pump density variation
of CNG is much bigger than the LPG one (LPG network is three times bigger than CNG one). CNG
market share would also react more since its pump density elasticity is high. The results confirm
that pump density increase is effective in stimulating demand only if it means a large increase in
the number of pumps. In this extreme example the large majority of newly sold cars would be on
a green fuel.
[Figure 9 about here.]
Differently from before, market share variations are stronger where pre-existing markets where
weak. These results are important because they highlight the incidence of the regulation shifts with
market characteristics.
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7 Conclusion
Assembling a rich database on cars sold and filling station locations in 2012, I document the
importance of fuel availability in the choice of adopting AF vehicles. I find that pump density
elasticity is over twice as high for AF vehicles than for traditional fuel ones. I develop and estimate
a joint model of demand for cars and entry of AF fuels station to compare different policies to foster
green car adoption. First, I compare the effect of a price-subsidy on the adoption of alternative
fuel cars with a fixed cost reduction for new pumps supplying AF. Then, I consider the effect of
increasing filling station density to different standards.
On the one hand, I find that price rebates is an effective policy to foster the use of AF cars including
large market share variation is above 25%. However, its indirect effect on AF pump density (3.09%
for LPG and 5.31 for CNG) suggest that the effect would disappear once the subsidy expired. On
the other hand, subsidy to AF filling stations show strong effects on both size of the markets. The
effect on the supply side implies that its impact would be more persistent the consumer subsidies.
Both of the policy imply a change in market composition such that CO2 produced per car is
reduced by 1%. However, relevant market heterogeneity suggests that policy comparisons should
be performed at a more local level taking into account the AF targeted for the policy. Finally, I
find that fixing a standard density for AF filling stations has widely different effects depending on
the definition of what “minimum requirements” means. This paper is the first to compare the effect
of different policies targeted to the two sides of the market, finding evidences of the importance
of modeling the two markets together in order to compare the overall effects of the subsidies. My
analysis has, however, some limitations. First of all, I model consumers and filling stations in a
one-shot game while the durability of cars and, even more so, infrastructures, would suggest that
dynamic effects may be important. Moreover, I do not consider cars manufacturers decisions, taking
vehicle choice set exogenous. I focus only on sales of new vehicles and I do not consider the effect of
the policy on “after-market” gasoline engine conversion to AF ones or on car replacement. Finally,
the effects on CO2 emissions are computed ignoring possible effects on driving behavior. Each of
these issues could be material for future works.
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Table 1: Summary statistics - Demand
VARIABLES LPG CNG DIESEL GASOLINE
price (thousands of e) 16.17 18.49 23.61 14.98
(4.11) (5.93) (9.04) (6.11)
power/weight (kw/kg) 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
fuel cost (e/100 km) 6.08 4.29 8.33 9.96
(0.86) (0.85) (1.65) (1.66)
acceleration (seconds) 12.99 13.40 11.99 12.98
(1.60) (1.85) (2.13) (2.14)
truk (l) 285.74 256.06 374.38 275.98
(80.75) (175.43) (126.18) (98.89)
(pump/kmsq)*100 1.90 0.77 11.86 12.50
(1.56) (0.78) (10.87) (11.12)
CO2 emissions (g/km) 122.39 116.67 125.91 127.46
(16.98) (14.48) (24.67) (20.89)
N. of observations 41091 12826 216326 131046
N. of variants 90 21 647 672
Note: The table reports summary statistics of car characteristics sold in 2012 (standard errors in brackets). The
table presents vehicle characteristics that are sales weighted over the 611 observed LMA in 2012 by fuel type. Price
includes local taxes.
Table 2: Summary statistics - Entry
VARIABLES LPG CNG
fuel per car 1313.44 1492.57
(790.82) (371.98)
land value 2.72 2.72
(0.00) (0.00)
pumps 5.03 1.65
(8.72) (3.03)
stock cars 2931.70 1202.33
(8645.44) (2883.76)
Observations 611 572
Note: The table reports summary statistics on filling stations’ variable profits at market level.
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Table 3: Demand Results
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Logit Demand IV Logit Demand IV Nested Logit
price -0.01 -0.21 -0.14
(0.0004) (0.0183) (0.0141)
sigma 0.24
(0.009)
log(power/weight) -0.52 0.01 -0.13
(0.017) (0.053) (0.040)
log(euro/100km) -0.30 -0.56 -0.54
(0.007) (0.026) (0.020)
log(acceleration) -0.07 -1.94 -1.34
(0.021) (0.176) (0.134)
log(length) 0.10 0.19 0.14
(0.008) (0.013) (0.010)
lpg*pump/kmsq 0.05 0.05 0.10
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
cng*pump/kmsq 0.30 0.39 0.34
(0.006) (0.011) (0.008)
diesel*pump/kmsq -0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
gasoline*pump/kmsq 0.00 -0.01 0.00
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
fuelFE YES YES YES
marketFE YES YES YES
monthFE YES YES YES
segmentFE YES YES YES
modelFE YES YES YES
R2 0.80 0.69 0.83
mean elasticity 0.29 -4.20 -3.48
Note: In column (2) price is instrumented while in column(3) price and within group market share are instrumented.
F-statistics for the first-stage regressions are 8245 and 1892. The instrumental variables are the sum of the char-
acteristics of cars used in the regression produced by the same firm and produced by other firms, dummy variables
equal to one in presence of city laws which favor the circulation of AFl car or regional laws that discount annual
taxes for AF cars. Standard errors in brackets.
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Table 4: Substitution pattern
average average cross elasticity wrt car with fuel:
fuel group own elasticity lpg cng diesel gasoline
lpg -2.774 0.094 0.004 0.008 0.004
cng -3.056 0.003 0.089 0.004 0.003
diesel -4.156 0.006 0.005 0.095 0.008
gasoline -2.626 0.005 0.005 0.012 0.074
Note: The table lists the average own and cross-price elasticities of demand for each nest.
Average price elasticity is different for each fuel. The pattern of the cross-price elasticities reflects model assumptions:
the average cross-price elasticities between same-fuel cars are higher than the cross-price elasticities between cars
with different fuels. This pattern is much more pronounced for alternative fuel cars.
Table 5: Entry Results
VARIABLES LPG CNG
constant 10.64 12.00
(0.23) (0.23)
ln(land value) 0.06 0.01
(0.02) (0.02)
mandatoryAF 0.14 -0.20
(0.07) (0.09)
north-east -0.08 0.05
(0.11) (0.11)
center -0.08 0.37
(0.11) (0.11)
south -0.30 0.21
(0.10) (0.11)
islands -0.47 -0.16
(0.12) (0.17)
ω 0.72 0.61
(0.02) (0.03)
Observations 611 572
Implied fixed costs 41681 163389
Note: The table reports the coefficients of the ordered probit estimated through maximum likelihood. The main
coefficient of interest is the constant. The implied mean fixed cost are reported in the bottom line. I am not reporting
the marginal effects, since I am only interested in coefficients’ signs.
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Table 6: AF car price rebate counterfactual.
(a) LPG
Avg 5th LPG 95th LPG
percentile percentile
(% ∆) (%∆) (% ∆)
Direct effect
LPG 23.84 22.25 29.22
CNG -1.02 -3.55 -1.42
Diesel -1.02 -3.55 -1.42
Gasoline -1.02 -3.55 -1.42
Overall effect
LPG 29.83 24.10 37.12
CNG -2.01 -5.33 -3.63
Diesel -2.16 -5.33 -3.63
Gasoline -2.16 -5.33 -3.63
LPG
pump 3.09 0.00 20.78
density
(b) CNG
Avg 5th CNG 95th CNG
percentile percentile
(% ∆) (%∆) (% ∆)
Direct effect
LPG -0.82 0.00 -0.85
CNG 15.39 0.00 29.96
Diesel -0.82 0.00 -0.85
Gasoline -0.82 0.00 -0.85
Overall effect
LPG -6.32 0.00 -3.48
CNG 33.31 0.00 50.12
Diesel -7.23 -1.11 -4.64
Gasoline -6.09 -0.64 -3.48
CNG
pump 5.31 0.00 67.28
density
Note: The tables report the effects of 2,000e price reduction of LPG (panel (a)) and CNG (panel(b)) cars considered
one per time. The top panels reports the direct effect of this policy on the market shares, while the bottom panels
report the total effect of this policy on both market share and filling station density. The first column refers to the
average variation of market share and pump density. The second column and third column report the effect of the
policy in the market in which the LPG (CNG) market share variation was equal respectively to the 5th and 95th
percentile.
Results are average from 100 simulations of the model.
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Table 7: Subsidy to AF gas station counterfactual.
(a) LPG
Avg 5th density 95th density
percentile percentile
(% ∆) (%∆) (% ∆)
Direct effect
LPG
pump 47.04 0.00 114.83
density
Overall effect
LPG 16.92 1.21 13.14
CNG -1.10 -0.06 -0.59
Diesel -1.12 -0.06 -0.59
Gasoline -1.12 -0.06 -0.59
LPG
pump 59.86 0.00 153.42
density
(b) CNG
Avg 5th density 95th density
percentile percentile
(% ∆) (%∆) (% ∆)
Direct effect
CNG
pump 34.88 0.00 119.29
density
Overall effect
LPG -4.06 0.00 -18.99
CNG 96.09 0.00 560.08
Diesel -4.06 0.00 -18.99
Gasoline -4.06 0.00 -18.99
CNG
pump 65.67 0.00 211.54
density
Note: The table reports the effects of a 50% reduction of the fixed costs of entry in the LPG market. The top panel
reports the direct effect of this policy on the filling station density, while the bottom panel reports the total effect of
this policy on both market share and filling station density. The second column and third column report the effect
of the policy in the market in which the LPG (CNG) pump density variation was equal respectively to the 5th and
95th percentile.
Results are average from 100 simulations of the model.
Table 8: Setting filling station standard.
(a) (b)
Average AF pump density Gasoline pump density
Avg ∆ (%) Avg ∆ (%)
LPG 2.41 29.78
CNG 0.77 642.61
Diesel -0.12 -18.75
Gasoline -0.12 -18.75
Note: Column(a) reports the variation in market composition implied by increasing the pump density in markets
where it is lower than the average level at the mean pump density. Column(b) reports the variation in market
composition implied by the increasing filling station densities at the gasoline one.
Results are average from 100 simulations of the model.
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Figure 1: Vehicles per type of fuels. Italy 2002-2014
.
Note: The figure shows the market trend by fuel in Italy from 2002 to 2014.
The left panel plots the share of cars by fuel type.
The right panel plots the quantity of cars in levels.
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Figure 2: Fuel price per 100 km
.
Note: The figure plots the fuel cost for running 100km from 2008 until 2013. Fuel costs are computed using the
average fuel efficiency for “compact” cars (as reported in the specialized magazine “Quattroruote” September 2012).
Fuel prices cannot be compared: CNG is not sold in liters but in kilograms and fuel efficiency varies per fuel.
Gasoline and diesel price often move together and diesel cars are more than 30% cheaper to ride than gasoline ones.
Alternative fuels are not so tightly linked to gasoline price because they are subject to a different tax regime. In
2008 lpg was 35% cheaper to run than gasoline while in 2013 the running cost difference became 40% while cng is
on average 70% cheaper to run.
30
Figure 3: Market share of Alternative Fuel New Cars and filling station density.
.
Note: The figure shows Italian LMA share of AF cars and filling station density in 2012. The maps above refer to
LPG (autogas) cars and filling stations, the below maps refer to CNG (natural gas) cars and filling stations. The
maps on the left refer to the market share at market level, the maps on the right refer to the number of the filling
stations offering the specified fuel per 100 squared kilometers
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Figure 4: Share of new cars 2012 vs pumps per km2
.
Note: The panels report scatterplots between the share of AF cars sold in 2012 and the AF filling stations’ density.
Each dot refers to a LMA and its dimension is proportional to market dimension. The line refers to the slope of a
weighted regression of the share of AF cars on the AF filling stations’ density.
The left panel refers to LPG (autogas) cars, the right one refers to CNG (natural gas) cars. There is a significant
positive correlation between pump density and market share, this is higher but more disperse for cng than lpg.
Figure 5: Policy experiments:
Market share of LPG New Cars and filling station density variation.
.
Note: The figure shows Italian LMA share of AF cars and in filling station density. The maps above refer to car
price rebate effects, the below maps refer to filling station subsiedies effects. The maps on the left refer to the market
share at market level, the maps on the right refer to the number of the filling stations offering the specified fuel per
100 squared kilometer
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Figure 6: Policy experiments:
Market share of CNG New Cars and filling station density.
.
Note: The figure shows Italian LMA variation in share of CNG cars and in filling station density. The maps above
refer to car price rebate effects, the below maps refer to filling station subsiedies effects. The maps on the left refer
to the market share at market level, the maps on the right refer to the number of the filling stations offering the
specified fuel per 100 squared kilometers.
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Figure 7: Policy experiments:
Cost difference, price rebates vs filling station subsidy
.
Note: The figure shows the distribution of the difference between the cost of the price rebates and filling station
subsidy in the Italian LMA. Observations that lies to the left of zero are market in which price rebates are more
costly while observations that lies to the right of zero are markets in which filling station subsidies are more costly.
The left panel refers to LPG vehicle price rebates and LPG filling station subsidy. The right panel refers to CNG
vehicle price rebates and CNG filling station subsidy.
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Figure 8: Policy experiments:
Cost effectiveness in terms of CO2 difference, price rebates vs filling station subsidy
.
Note: The figure shows the distribution of the difference between the cost effectiveness in terms of CO2 per kilometer
reduction of the price rebates and filling station subsidy in the Italian LMA. Observations that lies to the left of zero
are market in which price rebates are more cost-effective while observations that lies to the right of zero are markets
in which filling station subsidies are more cost-effective.
The left panel refers to LPG vehicle price rebates and LPG filling station subsidy. The right panel refers to CNG
vehicle price rebates and CNG filling station subsidy.
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Figure 9: Setting filling station standards.
Note: The maps report the variation in market composition implied by the filling station stangards. In the top panel,
I report the effect of shifting pump density of markets below the average at the average density. In the bottom panel,
I report the effect of shifting the pump density at the gasoline pump density level.
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Appendix
A Summary statistics
In this section, further insights about the market characteristics are presented. In the Local
Market Area (LMA) are sold 36 different brands, belonging to 19 manufacturing groups. In Table
A.1 I report some summary statistics about car builders’ market share per fuel. Looking at filling
station market, in Table A.2 I report the time series of AF filling stations in Italy, while in Table
A.3 are reported filling stations by brand and fuel.
Table A.1: Summary statistics - Market share by manufacturer and fuel type.
Car builder group Gasoline Diesel LPG Natural gas
Fiat 9.0 % 7.1% 5.5% 4.7%
Volkswagen 3.8% 8.4% 0.3% 0.2%
BMW 1.19% 2.5%
GM(Chevrolet, Opel) 3.2% 3.4% 2.7% 0.4%
PSA (Citroen Peugeot) 4.2% 5.1% 0.7 %
Renault 2.5 % 5.9% 2.1%
Daihatsu Motor Co., Ltd (Toyota) 3.9% 1.6%
Ford 2.5% 4.6% 1.1%
Hyundai 2.9% 3.7% 0.2%
Mercedes 0.4% 1.5 % 0%
Suzuki 1.2% 0.3% 0%
Note: The table reports summary statistics on market share for the elven largest manufacturer
I compute the market share over the total number of units sold in 2012 to private owners (863,818).
B Derivation of likelihood function.
Given the primitives of the model, the profitability condition bounds naturally lead to an or-
dered probit. I can write the log-likelihood according to the distribution of νm.
L(θ) =
∑
ln
(
Φ
(
ln(vpm(nm))− γWm
ω
)
− Φ
(
ln(vpm(n+ 1))− γWm
ω
))
. (8)
Substituting vp with vˆp I get
Table A.2: AF filling stations in Italy. 2000-2013.
year LPG CNG
2000 1949 336
2002 2126 402
2006 2311 529
2008 2351 665
2009 2358 693
2010 2364 718
2011 2350 718
2012 3201 896
2013 3275 974
Note: The table reports the time series of the number of AF filling stations in Italy. Sources: ecomotori.net,
prezzibenzina.it, Euromobility Report(2007) Quagliano et al. (2009)“Libro Bianco sul metano per autotrazione”,
“Report on Fuel Distribution Network in Piedmont” (2012).
Table A.3: Summary statistics - Filling stations by brand and fuel
Brand Gasoline Diesel LPG Natural gas
Api-IP 3444 3425 391 67
Eni 4029 4025 677 165
Esso 2331 2329 273 34
Q8 2186 2184 254 30
Shell 688 686 114 22
Tamoil 1476 1469 197 37
TotalErg 2818 2811 308 56
Others and unbranded 2742 2739 856 425
Total 19,714 19,668 3,070 836
Note: The table reports summary statistics on filling station brands.
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L(θ) =
∑
m
ln
(
Φ
(
ln((pm −mci)k 1nm (qˆm(nm) +Qm))− γWm
ω
)
− Φ
(
ln((pm −mci)k 1nm+1 (qˆm(nm + 1) +Qm)))− γWm
ω
))
.
(9)
Consider the number of sold cars qmf in a market m with a given fuel f . Since I consider a nested
logit, following Berry (1994), I can compute the market share as:
sjm = sj|mfsmf =
= exp(δjm/(1− σ))
Dmf
D1−σmf∑
mf D
1−σ
mf
,
Dmf =
∑
j∈f
exp(δjm/(1− σ)),
(10)
where the mean utility is δjm = αpjm + xjβ + njmλ+ ξjm.
The quantity of cars using a given fuel is:
qmf =
∑
j∈Cf
sjmLm. (11)
Using equation (9) and (11) I get the likelihood I maximize to estimate γ.
L(θ) =
∑
m
ln
Φ
 ln
(
(pm −mci)k 1nm (
∑
j∈Cf sˆj(nm) +Qm)
)
− γWm
ω

− Φ
 ln
(
(pm −mci)k 1nm+1 (
∑
j∈Cf sˆj(nm + 1) +Qm)
)
− γWm
ω
 .
C Robustness check
In this section I explore the robustness of my results in demand estimation, considering filling
station density endogenous. The idea is that stations and cars’ market shares are co-determined.
A valid instrument for filling station density is the number of filling stations at the beginning of
2009 since during 2008 the sector was liberalized. I could assume that before 2009 entry choice
could happen/not happen even if it was not/was profitable. Therefore, the pre-reform number of
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Table C.1: Demand Robustness check. Endogenous pump density
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES IV Logit IV Logit IV Nested Logit IV Nested Logit
density instruments density instruments
price -0.21 -0.20 -0.14 -0.14
(0.0183) (0.0181) (0.0141) (0.0139)
sigma 0.24 0.24
(0.009) (0.009)
log(power/weight) 0.01 0.19 -0.13 -0.16
(0.053) (0.052) (0.040) (0.040)
log(euro/100km) -0.56 -0.56 -0.54 -0.55
(0.0264) (0.0262) (0.0199) (0.0197)
log(acceleration) -1.94 -1.86 -1.34 -1.29
(0.176) (0.173) (0.134) (0.132)
log(lenghth) 0.19 0.19 0.14 0.14
(0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010)
lpg*pump/kmsq 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.11
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
cng*pump/kmsq 0.39 0.38 0.34 0.36
(0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008)
diesel*pump/kmsq 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
gasoline*pump/kmsq -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
fuelFE YES YES YES YES
marketFE YES YES YES YES
monthFE YES YES YES YES
segmentFE YES YES YES YES
modelFE YES YES YES YES
R2 0.69 0.70 0.83 0.83
mean elasticity -4.20 -4.02 -3.48 -3.30
Note: Standard errors in brackets.
Column (1) and column(2) report coefficients of logit estimation. Colum(1), endogenous variable, price; column (2),
endogenous variables, price and pump density.
Column (3) and column(4) report coefficients of nested logit estimation (nests=fuels). Colum(3), endogenous varibles,
price and within nest share; Column(4), endogenous varibles, price, within nest share and pump density.
In column (1) and (3) instruments: “classical BLP” and local legislation alternative duel vehicles demand shifter.
In column (2) and (4) instruments: “classical BLP”, local legislation alternative duel vehicles demand shifter and
the number of filling stations in 2009 as instruments.
filling stations is exogenous. The relevance of the instrument is suggested by the persistence of the
number of filling station during time. I checked the relevance of the instruments computing the
F-statistic for each endogenous regressor.
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